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INTRODUCTION
The modern version of the United States internship system has
changed over the years. It is believed internships descended from
professional apprenticeships, which originated with the trade guilds of
Europe in the eleventh and twelfth century. 1 In the trade guilds, a
person would pay to work alongside a “master,” who would teach him
a skill. 2 Apprentices could spend several years working alongside their
“master,” and typically started their training at the age of sixteen. 3

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Isaac J. Spradlin, The Evolution of Interns, FORBES (April 27, 2009),
https://www.forbes.com/2009/04/27/intern-history-apprenticeship-leadership
-careers-jobs.html (last accessed Oct. 1, 2017).
2
Meaghan Haire and Kristi Oloffson, Interns, TIME MAGAZINE (July 30, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1913474,00.html (last accessed
Oct. 1, 2017).
3
Id.
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Internships are recognized as a necessary experience for career
development. 4 Over time, they became an integral part of a person’s
education and are sometimes required to earn a college degree. 5 In
today’s economy, many employers consider internship experience as
one of the most significant factors in hiring decisions. 6 However, if an
intern is not considered an employee by law, they are not afforded the
same protections under Title VII or the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”). 7 Under the FLSA, employees are guaranteed a minimum
wage for their work, but the Act does not provide a clear definition of
the term “employee.” 8 In addition, lack of Title VII protection exposes
interns to discrimination and hostile work environments, such as
sexual harassment. 9
Recently, there was been an increase in litigation involving
unpaid internships. 10 Unpaid interns argue that employers cannot
avoid FLSA requirements simply by labeling employees as interns,
contending that interns should be considered employees only when
they successfully show an employer-employee relationship. 11
4

Spradlin, supra note 1.
Robert J. Tepper & Matthew P. Holt, Unpaid Internships: Free Labor or
Valuable Learning Experience?, 2015 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 323 (2015).
6
Human resources professionals recently ranked internship experience as one
of the most important factors when hiring an applicant. See Joanna Venator &
Richard V. Reeeves, Unpaid Internships: Support Beams for the Glass Floor,
Bookings Inst. (July 7, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobilitymemos/2015/07/07/unpaid-internships-support-beams-for-the-glass-floor/
7
See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) (establishing
the trainee exception under the FLSA).
8
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)–(2) (2013).
9
See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 527, 529
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that an intern was not protected under Title VII although
she was sexually harassed at her internship site).
10
See Ross Perlin, Unpaid Interns: Silent No More, N.Y. TIMES (July 20,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/jobs/unpaid-interns-silent-no-more.html
(stating that over 15 unpaid internship lawsuits have been filed since summer of
2013).
11
See Matthew H. Nelson, Internship and Federal Law: Are Interns
Employees?, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 36 (2010).
5
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Currently, there is no federally regulated definition of “intern.” 12 The
Supreme Court attempted to shed light on the subject in Walling v.
Portland Terminal Co., 13 which provided guidance on how courts
should determine the circumstances when an unpaid trainee may be
considered an employee under the FLSA. Since that decision, the U.S
Department of Labor 14 (“DOL”) and various circuit courts have
attempted to interpret the Walling factors as applied to modern day
internship programs. As a result, four predominant tests have
emerged: 15 The Wage & Hour Division (“WHD”) factors, 16 the
“primary beneficiary” test, 17 “the totality of the circumstances” test, 18
and the Glatt test. 19
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit analyzed this issue in Hollins v.
Regency Corp. 20 In Hollins, the Seventh Circuit held that cosmetology
students, whom worked in a salon for school credit, were not
employees covered by the FLSA. 21 As a result, those students were

12

See Louis C. LaBrecque, Bills Would Bar Bias Against Unpaid Interns by
Government, Congress and Private Sector, [2015] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 144,
at A-8 (July 28, 2015) (reporting on the recent introduction of the Unpaid Intern
Protection Act, which defines “intern” and, if enacted, would protect interns from
“workplace harassment and discrimination” in the private sector, as well as at state
and local government levels).
13
330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
14
In 2010, The U.S Department of Labor, Wage & Hour Division released Fact
Sheet #71, a six-factor test to help differentiate an employee from an unpaid intern.
Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2010),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf.
15
All the four tests will be discussed in Section II of this note.
16
U.S Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #71, supra note 14.
17
See, e.g., McLaughing v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
18
See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1993);
Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267 (5th Circ. 1982).
19
See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 803 F.3d 1199, 1212 (2d Cir.
2015).
20
867 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2017).
21
Id.
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not entitled to compensation for the time they worked in the salon. 22
The court also discussed the various established tests that have
emerged from other circuits that have grappled with the distinction
between an employee and an unpaid intern/trainee. It ultimately
decided on a combination of the relevant tests, which it called the
“economic reality test.” 23
This note unfolds in five parts. Part I gives a brief overview of the
FLSA and the federal government’s involvement in trying to define
the FLSA’s self-defining “employee” definition. Part II focuses on the
different tests employed by the DOL and circuit courts across the
nation when attempting to determine who constitutes an employee
under the FLSA. Part III analyzes the recent Seventh Circuit decision
of Hollins v. Regency Corp. and discusses the court’s hesitation to
articulate a specific and definitive test to apply in cases in which it is
necessary to first determine whether an employer is properly
classifying employees as “interns” or “trainees,” or if those persons
should be deemed “employees” by law. Part IV looks at the dangers
unpaid interns face when they are not considered employees,
specifically focusing on the issues that arise under Title VII in the
context of sexual harassment in the workplace. Finally, Part V
advocates for a clear, universal, two-question test to determine
whether unpaid interns should be considered employees under the
FLSA.
I. THE FLSA AND ITS SELF-DEFINING EMPLOYEE DEFINITION
A. Brief Overview of the FLSA
The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) was enacted on June
25, 1938. 24 The FLSA requires that all nonexempt employees 25 receive

22

Id.
Id.
24
Willis J. Nordlund, A Brief History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 39 Lab.
L. J. 715, 718, 720–21 (1988).
23
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minimum wage and overtime pay. 26 It sets a minimum wage of $.25
per hour (rising to $0.40/hr by 1945), fixed the maximum work hours
to 44 (falling to 40 hr/week by 1940), and banned child labor. 27 This
act was part of a strong push, led by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, 28 for government control over the hours and wages of all
workers, specifically those of children. 29
When Congress enacted the FLSA, it declared that the “labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers” 30 created burdens and perils to the labor markets and
interstate commerce. 31 Thus, Congress believed enacting the FLSA
and creating a federal minimum wage requirement improved a
worker’s quality of life. 32
Section 6(a) of the FLSA established the federal minimum rate
employers must pay their employees. 33 The minimum wage
requirement applies to every employment relationship that falls under

25

Employees are considered Non-Exempt when they are primarily performing
work that is subject to the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
overtime pay is required. Dep't. of Human Res., FLSA Non-Exempt and Expect
Defined, UNIV. OF MINN., https://humanresources.umn.edu/compensation-andclassification/flsa-exempt-nonexempt-defined (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
26
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C §201, et seq.
27
Duncan Farthing-Nichol, Social Mobility in the New Economy:
Transforming Unpaid Internships through an Educational Inquiry Test DIGITAL
ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT HARVARD (April 2014),
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/12921732.
28
The Act also had social implication due to the Great Depression. John
Hardman, The Great Depression and the New Deal, ETHICS OF DEV. IN A GLOBAL
ENV’T. (July 26, 1999)
https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/poverty_prejudice/soc_sec/hgreat.htm (last
accessed Dec. 1, 2017).
29
Nordlund, Supra. Note 24.
30
FLSA §2, 29 U.S.C § 202.
31
Id.
32
See 29 U.S.C §206.
33
FLSA 6(a), 29 U.S.C § 206.
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the FLSA’s definition of “employee.” 34 However, the FLSA broadly
defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer” and
defines “employed” as “to suffer or permit to work.” An employer, in
turn, “includes any person acting . . . in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee.”
These definitions allow for broad interpretations and lead to
uncertainty as to when interns are employees under the FLSA. 35
Nevertheless, the courts have found it proper to reduce the breath of
the definitions by carving out certain exceptions. One of those
exceptions was established in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., as the
“trainee” exception, 36 which has formed the basis of unpaid intern law.
Further, if an unpaid intern is found to be an employee then the FLSA
standards apply, 37 and the employer is forced by the DOL to pay that
intern the federal minimum wage and any overtime compensation. 38
C. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., The Supreme Court’s Attempt to
Differentiate Employees from Unpaid Trainees
The Supreme Court has yet to decide if unpaid interns are
considered employees under the FLSA, but it has provided some
guidance for courts grappling with cases brought by unpaid trainees. 39
In Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 40 the Supreme Court carved out a

34

29 U.S.C § 203(e)(1)–(5).
See generally, David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student
Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215, 218–19 (2002).
36
330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
37
Note that there are certain State Law wage and hour protections that can
possibly protect interns. Wage and Hour Div., State Labor Laws, U.S DEP’T OF
LABOR https://www.dol.gov/whd/state/state.htm (last accessed Dec. 1, 2017).
38
See Enforcement Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/screen74.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
The DOL has a specific Wage and Hour Division that “enforces the FLSA for
employees.” Id.
39
See Walling, 330 U.S. at 152.
40
Id.
35
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specific “trainee” exception under the FLSA. 41 Portland Terminal was
a railroad company that offered a course of practical training to
prospective yard brakemen. 42 The training was a necessary requisite;
brakemen applicants were never accepted until they had taken the
training course. 43 However, the company did not pay the individuals
for their training time. 44 Thus, the plaintiff, a brakeman, argued he was
an employee under the FLSA and was entitled to compensation for the
time he spent in the training program. 45
The Portland Terminal training course consisted of working under
the supervision of a yard crew. 46 The trainee would first observe and
then was gradually permitted to do actual work under close scrutiny
and supervision. 47 The Court noted there was “no question” that the
trainees were doing the type of activities covered by the FLSA. 48
However, the Court also stated that it would not interpret the FLSA to
create an employment relationship when a person’s work was intended
to serve only his or her own advantage, stating,
broad as [the definitions of employer and employee are],
they cannot be interpreted so as to make a person whose
work serves only his own interest an employee of another
person who gives him aid and instruction. Had these
trainees taken courses in railroading in a public or private
vocational school, wholly disassociated from the railroad,
it could not reasonably be suggested that they were
employees of the school within the meaning of the Act. 49
41

Id.
Id. at 149.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 152–153. The Court also claimed that the FLSA “[did not] intended to
stamp all persons as employees, who, without any express or implied compensation
42
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The Court ultimately held that the plaintiff was a trainee of the
company and, therefore, did not fall within the FLSA’s definition of
“employee.” 50 In support of its holding, the Court looked to the intent
of the legislature when enacting the statute. 51 The Court noted that the
FLSA’s purpose “was to ensure that every person whose employment
contemplated compensation should not be compelled to sell his
services for less than prescribed minimum wage.” 52
The Court also noted several factors and observations which
helped it determine the trainee was not an employee. 53 First, the Court
noted the trainees’ work did not “displace” any of the company’s
regular employees. 54 Second, the Court looked at the fact that the
trainees’ work was closely supervised, such that the “work [the
trainees did] did not expedite the company’s business, but may [have] .
. . actually impede[d] . . . it.” 55 The Court further noted the importance
of the training program in the trainee’s subsequent employment with
the company. 56 In addition, the Court also relied on the trainee’s lack
of a guaranteed job following the completion of the program, and the
trainee’s lack of expectation of compensation. 57 Finally, the Supreme
Court considered the educational benefit of Portland’s training course,
as well as the instructional benefit for the trainee. 58 Based on all of its
observations, the Court determined Portland received “no immediate
agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises on another.” Id. at
152
50
Id. at 153.
51
Id. at 152.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 153.
54
Id. at 149–50.
55
Id. at 150.
56
Id. at 149–50. However, subsequent employment with the railroad company
was not guaranteed upon completion of the training program. After the individuals
completed the program they were then placed into a pool of people that the railroad
could hire from when necessary. Id.
57
Id. at 150.
58
Id. at 152–53.
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advantage” 59 from the trainees work, thus concluding the plaintiff was
not an employee within the meaning of the FLSA. 60
D. The Department of Labor’s, Wage & Hour Division Six-Factor Test
In the aftermath of Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 61 employers
were faced with the question of whether the workers fell under the
“trainee exception” or whether an employment relationship existed
with their trainees. 62 To provide a more direct approach and
interpretation of Wailing, the Department of Labor, under their Wage
& Hour Division (“WHD”), devised a six-factor test. 63 In April 2010,
the DOL under WHD released these factors on Fact Sheet #71:
Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 64
The WHD determined that for an employment relationship not to
exist and federal protections to apply, all of the following factors must
be met: (1) the internship, even though it includes actual operation of
the facilities of the employer, is similar to training which would be
given in an educational environment; 65 (2) the internship experience is
for the benefit of the intern; 66 (3) the intern does not displace regular
employees but works under close supervision of existing staff; 67 (4)
the employer that provides the training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its

59

Id. at 153.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Elyse Brookhouser, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to
Determining Whether Interns are “Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 751, 756 (2015).
63
Wage & Hour Div., , Fact Sheet #71: Internships Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act U.S Dep’t of Labor (2010),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
60
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operations may actually be impeded; 68 (5) the intern is not necessarily
entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; 69 and (6) the
employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to
wages for the time spent in the internship. 70 The WHD concluded that
“[i]f all of the factors listed above are met, an employment relationship
does not exist under the FLSA, and the [FLSA’s] minimum wage and
overtime provisions do not apply to the intern.” 71
Although the DOL and WHD published this test as a Fact Sheet,
they are opinion letters, and many courts have taken it upon
themselves to interpret the Walling case and to develop their own
factors. 72 Fact sheets from the DOL do not hold the necessary force of
law to bind the courts. 73 Thus, all the DOL can do is strongly
encourage that its test be followed, and that the courts give deference
to its opinion.74 The WHD explained that the more an internship
program resembles an educational experience and offers an
68

Id.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See discussion in Section II.
73
See Wage & Hour Div., supra note 63 (“This publication is for general
information and is not to be considered in the same light as official statements of
position contained in the regulations”); see also Matthew Tripp, Note, In the Defense
of Unpaid Internships: Proposing a workable test for Eliminating Illegal
Internships, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 341, 354-66 (2015) (noting that some courts have
denied the DOL fact sheet any deference, as it is subject to much criticism for its
inconsistency with prior DOL interpretations).
74
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that “the
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance”). Furthermore, courts have also disagreed about the level of deference
to give the DOL Fact Sheet. Compare Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc.,
642 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that the DOL Fact Sheet #71 should not
be given deference under Skidmore), with some courts giving agency opinions great
deference according to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (creating a two-step test that affords deference to
Congress if it has spoken directly to the issue in question).
69
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educational benefit, the more likely the unpaid internship will fit into
the “trainee exception.” 75
1. The Issue with the DOL Factors
Even though Fact Sheet #71 is not federally enforced, many
jurisdictions have used the DOL’s six-factor test. 76 Employers have
also tried to navigate the landscape of internships by relying on the
WHD’s educational benefit rationale. 77 However, a key issue arises
when employers follow the DOL factors and exploit the education
benefit concept. 78
The issue is the test heavily focuses on student opportunities and
class credit. 79 Nevertheless, a growing number of interns in this
country are no longer college students. 80 Recently there has been a
growing number of post-graduate and “career-changers” that have
75

See Wage & Hour Div., supra note 63.
See Diana Shaginian, Note, Unpaid Internships in the Entertainment
Industry: The need for a Clear and Practical Intern Standard After the Black Swan
Lawsuit, 21 SW. J. INT’L L. 509, 516 (2015).
77
See Dana Schuster v. Kirsten Fleming, Conde Nast Intern: “I Cried Myself
to Sleep,” N.Y POST (Nov. 21, 2013, 6:36 AM),
http://nypost.com/2013/11/21/conde-nast-interns-speak-out-on-program-shutdown/.
78
Such as in Hollins v. Regency Corp., where the court states one of the
reasons that cosmetology interns are not employees is because they are getting
educational credit to fulfill their certificate, which can be a type of compensation.
144 F.Supp.3d 990, 993 (2015). However, what happens to those students who are
not aiming to get a certificate, they would not be working for certificate hours, so
what would be their type of compensation?
79
See Wage & Hour Div. Fact Sheet #71: Internships Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, U.S DEP’T OF LABOR (2010),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf.
80
See Amy Levin-Epstein, Why Internships Aren’t Just for College Students,
CBS NEWS (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-internships-arentjust-for-college-students/ (noting that there has been an increase in numbers of
individuals searching for internships that are recent graduates or older: “We have
noticed that 20 percent of the people searching … for internships are either recent
graduates or older. So, it's clear that internship seekers are no longer undergrads
alone”).
76

292

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

sought internships in today’s markets. 81 Thus, when more and more
employers require interns to be eligible to receive college credit as a
pre-requisite for their internship program, the employer excludes those
post-graduates and “career-changers”. 82 A system is needed that
addresses the growing number of individuals seeking unpaid
internships, 83 shifting the focus from educational benefit and focusing
on the benefit the intern brings to the employer. 84
II. THE DIFFERENT CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES
Recently, the courts have had an influx of individuals challenging
their unpaid intern status. Numerous circuit courts have had to address
whether various working relationships rise to a level of an employeeemployer relationship under the FLSA. While the DOL offered a sixfactor test, circuit courts, when faced with the question of determining
an intern’s employment relationship, have applied and adopted various
tests based on their individual interpretations of the Walling decision
and the DOL’s six-factor test. 85
81

See id.
See id.
83
While Interns may seek paid internships, the number is limited, which is
why many Interns end up in unpaid and often illegal internships. See Avik Roy, The
Unhappy Rise of The Millennial Intern, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/22/the-unhappy-rise-of-themillennial-intern/#7d73bb211328 (last accessed Dec. 1, 2017).
84
For example, the Second Circuit reasoned that the key issue in assessing
whether an individual was truly an “unpaid intern,” versus a mislabeled and
uncompensated employee, is determining which party—the individual or the
employer—derives the most benefit from the relationship: in other words, whether
the relationship is genuinely focused on the education and development of the
individual, or whether the “economic reality” of the situation makes the relationship
a type of “employment-in-disguise.” See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. 811
F.3d 528, 536-37 (2d Cir. 2015) (developing the Glatt test to help determine the
relationship).
85
Andrew Mark Bennett, Unpaid Internships & The Department of Labor:
The Impact of Underenforcement of the Fair Labor Standard Act on Equal
Opportunity, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 293, 302-06 (2011);
See also Cody Elyse Brookhouser, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to
82
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A. The Primary Beneficiary Test
1. The Fourth Circuit 86
In McLaughlin v. Ensley, the Fourth Circuit applied what is
known as the primary beneficiary test. 87 The Fourth Circuit developed
this test upon a cursory analysis of Walling, stating a worker could not
be an employee where “the principal purpose of the [work] was to
benefit the person in the employee status.” 88
In McLaughlin, the employer Kirby Ensley was the owner of a
snack food distribution service. 89 The employer employed route men
who drove his company trucks, restocked the vending machines, and
sold snack foods to retailers on a commission basis. 90 Before Ensley
hired a new route man, the applicant was required to participate in a
five-day orientation program. 91 During the five-day orientation
program, the prospective employee was exposed to the tasks they
would be expected to perform. 92 Over those five days, the trainees
worked a total of fifty to sixty hours, loaded and unloaded delivery
trucks, restocked Ensley’s vending machines, were given instructions
on how to drive the trucks, introduced to retailers, taught basic
Determining Whether Interns are “Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 751, 756 (2015).
86
The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly held “that the general test used to
determine if an employee is entitled to the protections of the Act is whether the
employee or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the trainees’ labor.” See
Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d, 785 (4th Cir. 1964); Isaacson v. Penn Community
Services, Inc., 450 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1971); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207
(4th Cir. 1989).
87
See Ensley, 877 F.2d at 1209.
88
See id. (quoting Isaacson v. Penn Cmty. Servs., Inc. 450 F.2d 1306, 1308
(4th Cir. 1971)).
89
See id. at 1208.
90
See id.
91
See id.
92
See id.
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vending machine maintenance, and occasionally helped with preparing
orders. 93 Nevertheless, the trainees were not paid for their work in that
five-day period. 94
The Fourth Circuit looked at who was receiving the benefit of the
program. 95 The court determined Ensley was the one receiving the
primary benefit from the orientation program. It noted that through the
program, Ensley had an opportunity to review if potential employees
would be successful for free. 96 The court also stated that one of the
most important factors evaluated was the nature of the training and
experience. 97 The Fourth Circuit determined Ensley’s training program
was very limited. 98 The individuals did not receive training
comparable to that which they would receive at a vocational school,
and the skills they were learning were so job specific that they would
be unable to transfer to other occupations. 99 Thus, Ensley primarily
benefitted from the training program, not the trainees. 100
2. The Sixth Circuit
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit utilized the primary
beneficiary test. 101 In Solis v. Larelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc.,
the central question focused on which standard was appropriate to
determine if students were employees as defined by the FLSA. Here,
the DOL sued the school alleging it had violated the FLSA’s child
labor provisions. Solis involved students at a boarding school in
Tennessee. 102 At the boarding school, the students received both
93

See id.
See id.
95
See id. at 1210.
96
See id.
97
See id.
98
See id.
99
See id.
100
See id.
101
See 642 F.3d 518, 519 (6th Cir. 2011).
102
See id.
94
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tangible and intangible benefits. 103 The students received hands-on
training like that offered in trade and vocational school, while also
attending academic courses. 104
The Sixth Circuit ultimately rejected the DOL’s argument that
their six-factor test was the appropriate standard. 105 The court noted
that the DOL’s six-factor test was rigid and inconsistent with the
holding in Walling. 106 The Sixth Circuit called the six-factor test a
“poor method for determining employee status in a training or
educational setting. 107 Thus, the court chose to use the primary
benefits test in determining if students were employees “since the
test’s generality makes it applicable to many different employeetrainee relationships.” 108 However, the Sixth Circuit modified the
primary benefit test by adding a factor that considered if the students
displaced any regular employees and whether the program provided
students with an educational experience. 109
Ultimately, the court concluded the boarding school students were
the ones receiving the primary benefit of the school’s training. 110 The
court determined that while the school did receive some benefit from
the students’ work, the students were also gaining significant
leadership skills and hands-on experience. 111 The court reasoned that
those skills made them into competitive candidates for trade
occupations after graduation, ultimately being the primary
beneficiaries. 112 The Sixth Circuit also supported their conclusion by
noting the students did not displace regular employees and, at times,
103

See id. at 520.
See id.
105
See id. at 525.
106
See id.
107
See id.
108
See id. at 529; see also Nicole M. Klinger, Will Work for Free: The
Legality of Unpaid Internships, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN & COM. L. 551 (2016).
109
See Solis, 642 F.3d 518, 529(6th Cir. 2011).
110
See id. at 520.
111
See id.
112
See id. at 532.
104
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disrupted instructors’ time. 113 Thus, the court concluded the students at
the school were not employees under the FLSA. 114
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
The totality of the circumstances test, unlike the primary
beneficiary test, looks not just at who is receiving the benefit, but at all
the factors found in Walling. 115 However, unlike the DOL’s test 116
where all factors must be present, courts that use the totality of the
circumstances test balance factors to determine the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the individuals working relationship. 117
The DOL’s approach of all-or-nothing has not been adopted by any
circuit courts because courts prefer a more flexible standard. 118
Nevertheless, courts have used the six factors in applying the totality
of the circumstances test. 119
1. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit utilized the totality of the circumstances test
when it determined whether trainees of American Airlines were
employees under the FLSA. 120 In Donovan v. American Airlines,
American Airlines required potential employees to undergo training at
American's Learning Center in Dallas, Texas, in order to be eligible
113

See id. at 530.
See id. at 532.
115
See Cody Elyse Brookhouser, Whaling on Walling: A Uniform Approach to
Determining Whether Interns are “Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 751, 759 (2015).
116
See Wage & Hour Div. , Fact Sheet #71: Internships Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR(2010),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf.
117
See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1029 (10th Cir. 1993).
118
See Solis, 642 F.3d at 525 (rejecting the all-or-nothing approach as too
rigid); Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026.
119
See Reich., 992 F.2d at 1026-29.
120
See Donovan v. American Airlines, 686 F.2d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 1982).
114
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for certain positions at American. 121 However, this training required
that the trainees give up their other jobs and move to Dallas. Further,
trainees were not paid for the time spent training, and they were not
guaranteed employment after completion of the American Airlines
training program. 122 Thus, before beginning training, each trainee
acknowledged, in writing, that he or she was not an employee during
training and that being accepted for training was not an offer of
employment. 123
For flight attendants, training was forty hours, five days a
week. 124 The training included learning the emergency and safety
features of each aircraft, as well as learning American Airlines’
internal procedures and practices. 125 However, the instruction was
designed to teach employees to work for American and not for other
airlines. 126 In addition, the trainees did not assist in commercial flights
nor displaced other employees. 127 The court believed that the DOL and
other tests were too stringent of a requirement, and it forced for-profit
companies to not benefit at all from a training or internship
program. 128 Therefore, to determine whether the trainees of American
Airlines were employees under the FLSA, the Fifth Circuit used the
balancing test. 129
The court considered the benefits American Airlines received with
those the trainee received. 130 The court stated: “Although training
benefits American by providing it with suitable personnel, the trainees
attend school for their own benefit, to qualify for employment they
121

Id. at 268.
Id.
123
Id. at 269.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See id. at 271–72 ( the court analyzes Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785,
788 (4th Cir. 1964)).
129
Id. at 272.
130
Id. at 272.
122
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could not otherwise obtain.” 131 The fact that the trainees had to give up
their jobs and move to Dallas for the training was considered an
opportunity cost, which the court saw as “a [students] sacrifice to
attend school. But [the sacrifices are made by] all who seek to learn a
trade of profession.” 132 Thus, through balancing the DOL’s factors and
the primary benefits tests factors, the Fifth Circuit court was able to
determine the trainees were not employees under the FLSA. 133
2. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has also used the totality of the circumstances
test when determining if an individual qualified as an employee under
the FLSA. 134 The Tenth Circuit used the flexible version of the DOL’s
six-factor test to determine if participants in a firefighter academy
were entitled to compensation under the FLSA. 135 According to the
Tenth circuit, all six factors were relevant but not a single factor was
dispositive. 136
In Reich, trainees attended Parker Fire’s academy for classes,
tours of the neighborhood, and simulations. 137 In addition to the
classes, the trainees also helped maintain fire trucks and other
firehouse equipment. 138 The Tenth Circuit court assessed the case
under the totality of the circumstances test and looked at the economic
reality of the relationship, using the DOL’s six-factors. 139 The court
noted that supporting the strict application of the DOL’s six-factors

131

Id.
Id.
133
See id. at 272.
134
Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993).
135
Id. at 1023.
136
Id. at 1027–29.
137
Id. at 1025.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 1027.
132
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would be inconsistent with the Walling Supreme Court analysis
because Walling does not support an all or nothing approach. 140
The Tenth Circuit then weighed the DOL’s six factors. 141 First, the
court determined that the curriculum taught at the academy was
similar to the educational experience a trainee would receive at any
firefighting academy. 142 The court stated that ‘‘[a] training program
that emphasizes the prospective employer’s particular policies is
nonetheless comparable to vocational school if the program teaches
skills that are fungible within the industry.’’ 143 Second, the court also
found that, while trainees were making “financial sacrifices,” 144 the
trainees benefited from the program because they were acquiring skills
that were transferable within the industry and required to be career
firefighters. 145 Third, the trainees did not displace any current
employees of the department. 146 Fourth, the trainees did not
immediately benefit the employer and any benefit was “de
minimis”. 147 Fifth, the court looked at the fact that “those who
successfully completed the course had every reasonable expectation of
being hired. 148 And lastly, the trainees understood that they would not
be receiving pay during their training. 149After balancing the factors
above, the court determined that five out of six factors favored that the
trainees were not employees under the FLSA. 150 The Fifth Circuit,
unlike the DOL, required that most factors be present, but it did not
require that all factors are met because a “single factor cannot carry

140

Id.
See id. at 1027.
142
Id. at 1027–28.
143
Id. at 1028.
144
Id. (the court compared college students as making similar sacrifices).
145
Id.
146
Id. at 1029.
147
Id. at 1028–29.
148
Id. at 1029.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1028.
141
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the entire weight of an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances . .
. .” 151
C. The Glatt Test
1. Origin of the Glatt Test in the Second Circuit
Recently, in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, the Second Circuit
addressed the question of when a trainee is an employee. 152 There,
three interns who worked in a movie production filed a class action
claiming they should have been categorized as employees and entitled
to back pay wages under the FLSA. 153 The interns worked for nine
months and were not compensated nor did they receive academic
credit. 154 The interns did menial office tasks, which included things
like buying a pillow for the director of the film and bringing him
tea. 155
The Second Circuit declined to use the DOL’s test because it was
too rigid to be consistent with Second Circuit court precedent. 156 The
court stated: “the proper question is whether the intern or the employer
is the primary beneficiary of the relationship.” 157 Thus, the court chose
to adopt a primary benefits test similar to those of the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits. 158 However, it delineated a list of nonexhaustive
considerations to be used to determine if an individual is an employee
under the FLSA. 159

151

Id. at 1029.
See 811 F.3d 528, 536–37 (2d Cir. 2015).
153
Id. at 530.
154
Id. at 532–33.
155
Id.
156
See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2015)
(citing Velez v. Sanches, 693 F.3d 308, 326 (2d Cir. 2012).
157
Id.
158
See discussion in Section II.A.
159
See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536–37.
152
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The court noted that primary benefits tests had three important
features: (1) the tests focused on the interns and their work, (2) it gave
the court the flexibility to examine the economic realities between the
parties, and (3) the test acknowledged that interns’ relationships with
their employers were analyzed in a different context than the typical
employer-employee relationship. 160 Thus, the non-exhaustive sevenfactors to aid district courts in determining an employment status
under the FLSA were:
(1) The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly
understand that there is no expectation of compensation. Any
promise of compensation, express or implied, suggests that the
intern is an employee–and vice versa.
(2) The extent to which the internship provides training that
would be similar to that which would be given in an educational
environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training
provided by educational institutions.
(3) The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal
education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of
academic credit.
(4) The extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s
academic commitments by corresponding to the academic
calendar. 161
(5) The extent to which the internship’s duration is limited to the
period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial
learning.
160

See id. at 536.
The court did not mention what the academic calendar in this case was. As
each educational institution can have different academic calendars. Academic
Calendar, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY (2017).
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/academic_calendar (last accessed Dec.
1, 2017).
161
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(6) The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather
than displaces, the work of paid employees while providing
significant educational benefits to the intern.
(7) The extent to which the intern and the employer understand
that the internship is conducted without entitlement to a paid job
when the internship concludes. 162
The seven factors were considerations, but no single factor was
dispositive. 163 The court stated that this test required ‘‘weighing and
balancing all of the circumstances,’’ where no element was
‘‘dispositive.’’ 164 The Second Circuit also noted that besides the seven
factors, the courts were free to consider any relevant evidence they
determined would be of aid when making a decision. 165 The court
believed that this approach was the most consistent with Portland
Terminal 166 because the approach focused on “the relationship
between the internship and the intern’s formal education.” 167
2. Adaptation of the Glatt Test by the Eleventh Circuit
In Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, the Eleventh Circuit adopted
the Second Circuit’s Glatt test to determine if an intern was an
employee under the FLSA. 168 In Shumann, twenty-five former nurse
anesthetists were required to participate in 550 clinical cases in order
to graduate. 169 The nurses alleged that they were employees under the
FLSA and were entitled to compensation because Collier Anesthesia
162

Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536–37.
Id. at 537.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152–53 (1947)
167
Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537.
168
803 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015).
169
Id.
163
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benefited from their work by employing fewer registered nurses. 170 In
addition, the students were required to work longer hours than those
required by their curriculum, and their services were billed by the
college. 171 The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, finding that the student were not employees under the
FLSA. 172
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the Second Circuit’s
Glatt test was the appropriate modern-day adaptation of the Supreme
Court’s factors in Walling 173. The Second Circuit’s approach
effectively determined who was the “primary beneficiary” in an
internship. 174 The court noted that “the best way to [determine the
primary beneficiary was] to focus on the benefits to the student while
still considering whether the manner in which the employer
implement[ed] the internship program [took] unfair advantage of or
[was] abusive towards the student.” 175
Furthermore, the court added additional guidance on how the
factors should be applied to the facts of the case, such as that
employers must have a legitimate reason for scheduling training when
school is not in session. 176 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
court “should consider whether the duration of the internship is grossly
excessive in comparison to the beneficial learning. The court vacated
the summary judgment for defendants and remanded to the district
court consistent with the opinion on the use of the Glatt test.

170

Id. at 1204.
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 1212.
174
Id. at 1203.
175
Id. at 1211.
176
Id. at 1213.
171
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III. HOLLINS V. REGENCY CORP.
A. Case Background
Recently the Seventh Circuit was tasked with determining which
test it would apply to the facts of Hollins v. Regency Corp. 177 In
January 2011, Venitia Hollins enrolled as a full-time cosmetology
student at Regency. 178 Regency operated a state licensed and
accredited cosmetology school. 179 Regency’s stated educational goals
were “to prepare students to pass the required state cosmetology
exams and teach them the entry-level skills needed to work in a
professional salon.” 180
Regency was governed by state regulations and the National
Accrediting Commission of Career Arts & Sciences. 181 Indiana and
Illinois state regulations required that Regency’s curriculum include at
least 1,500 hours of “clock time” and cosmetology-related subjects,
such as chemical treatment of hair, hair styling, shop management and
nail technology. 182 The regulations also required that the cosmetology
student received instruction in proper sanitation techniques. 183 The
instruction of the cosmetology topics needed to take the form of both
classroom and practical learning methods. 184
Thus, Regency divided its curriculum into three periods: (1)
workshop phase, (2) rehearsal phase, and (3) performance phase. 185
Regency provides 320 hours of introductory education on various

177

867 F.3d 830, 830 (7th Cir. 2015).
Hollins v. Regency Corp., 144 F. Supp. 3d 990 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff'd, 867
F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2017).
179
Id. at 991.
180
Id. at 991.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 992.
184
Id.
185
Id.
178

305

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/10

24

: Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Are they Trainees and Not Employees a

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

cosmetology subjects. 186 In order for students to move from the
workshop phase to the rehearsal phase, they must pass various written
and performance-based tests. 187 After they pass the workshop phase,
students are rotated in between the rehearsal and the performance base
phase. 188 For the performance phase, students participated on the
“performance floor.” 189 The performance floor is designed to replicate
a modern salon, indistinguishable from a fully licensed commercial
salon. 190 Here, customers are charged a fee for student-provided
services, at rates lower than those of licensed cosmetologist. 191
Venitia Hollins, alleged that since she spent time on the
performance floor serving customers and doing administrative and
cleaning duties, she was entitled to wages under the FLSA. 192 Hollins
claimed janitorial and administrative activities were not part of the
cosmetology curriculum and did not amount to the experience she
needed for her certification; therefore, she was entitled to
compensation. 193 The Seventh Circuit, using the Second Circuit’s
Glatt primary beneficiary test and the totality of the circumstances test
together (referenced here as the “economic reality test”), determined
that Venitia Hollins was not an employee under the FLSA. 194 The
Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court when it determined that
“[t]he economic reality of the relationship between Regency and its
students is that the students were engaged in their statutorily-mandated
curriculum to become a licensed cosmetologist while [the students]
were working on the performance floor.” 195 The Seventh Circuit stated

186

Id.
Id. at 993.
188
Id. at 992.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 993.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Hollins v. Regency Corp., 867 F.3d 830, 830 (7th Cir. 2015).
195
Hollins, 144 F. Supp. at 1007.
187

306

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

25

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

that “[this] require[d] us to [] examine[d] the ‘economic reality’ of the
working relationship.” 196
B. Court Analysis
Previously, in Vanskike v. Peters, 197 the Seventh Circuit “had
instructed district courts to assess the [‘] economic reality[’] of the
relationship between the proffered employee and his alleged
employer.” 198 However, in Hollins the district court revisited the topic,
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed its decisions. 199 Thus, after the
district court discussed Walling v. Portland Terminal, 200 it determined
that a flexible approach to the factors was consistent with the
teachings of Walling, and it rejected the DOL’s Fact Sheet#71. 201
Thus, the court found that a mixture of the Glatt factors, the “primary
beneficiary” test and “the totality of the circumstances,” shed
significant light on the economic reality of the relationship shared by
Hollins and the school, Regency. 202 The court also noted that no factor
is determinative, and everything should be considered using the
totality of the circumstances. 203
Applying the Glatt factors, the court first determined if Hollins
had an expectation of compensation when she was on the performance
floor. 204 The court stated that Hollins conceded she understood there
would be no compensation for her time spent on the floor or she would
get guaranteed employment. 205 The court also looked at the
196

Id. at 993.
974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House
Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33(1961)).
198
Hollins, 144 F. Supp. at 994.
199
Hollins, 867 F.3d at 837.
200
330 U.S. 148, 148 (1947).
201
Hollins, 144 F. Supp. at 997.
202
Id. at 998.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 993.
205
Id. at 998.
197
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similarities between the clinical/internship experience and that of
classwork. 206 If the work done in the unpaid position provided a
learning experience similar to that be given in a formal-educational
environment, the students were likely not employees. 207 Here, the
court said Hollins was practicing her cosmetology techniques on the
performance floor, which were things she also did in the classroom. 208
The court concluded that that fact supported the notion that Hollins
was not an employee. 209
Another factor the court looked at was whether Hollins received
educational credit. The court noted that a student receiving academic
credit is a strong indicator that the individual is not an employee under
the FLSA. 210 In this instance, Hollins was receiving academic credit
by working the performance floor. 211 Hollins was obtaining the 1,500
hours required of practical instruction before taking the license exam,
and there is no basis to infer Regency would offer salon services to the
public absent the requirement of the practical instruction requirement
hours. 212 The court also considered if the work was tied to the
academic calendar, 213 and if the length of the internship was limited to
a period that provide[d] the student with beneficial learning. 214 Here
the court noted that although Hollins had to work on Saturdays, when
school is not in session, it furthered her educational goals and provided
a more fulfilling experience. 215 The court declared the school had a
legitimate reason for requiring students to attend work on
Saturdays. 216 Saturdays were the busiest days, and they provided
206

Id. at 999.
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 1000.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
The court did not explain Regency’s academic calendar.
214
Hollins, 144 F.Supp.3d at 1001–02.
215
Id. at 1001.
216
Id.
207
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students with a greater supply of customers and a variety of
experience. 217 In addition, the time the students were required to work
was limited to only the 1,500 hours required for the state certification
exam. 218
The court also considered if the students’ work complemented,
rather than displaced, the work of paid employees stating that “[i]f the
students’ activities displace the trainer’s regular full-time employees,
then the economic realities might indicate the existence of an
employee-employer relationship.” 219 Here, Hollins did not allege
employees of Regency were displaced because Regency did not have
paid cosmetologists. 220 In fact, if Regency was not a school, there
would be no Regency performance floor. 221 Hollins also claimed that
because Regency fees to the public were lower, the students were
displacing licensed cosmetologists. 222 However, the court noted that if
it were to agree with Hollins, any clinical program in which students
perform services might displace people operating in the same
market. 223 The court stated that Hollins argument is too “broad [a]
swat,” and would effectively eliminate all student clinical services. 224
Thus, looking at the evidence the court found that the cosmetology
students were the primary beneficiaries of the program. 225
After the court considered all the factors, based on the totality of
the circumstances, it found the economic reality of Hollins was that
she was a student and was not an employee under the FLSA. 226. Thus,
Hollins was not entitled to compensation. 227
217

Id.
Id. at 1002.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 1002–03.
222
Id. at 993.
223
Id. at 1004.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
See id. at 1007.
227
Id.
218

309

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/10

28

: Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Are they Trainees and Not Employees a

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

C. The Seventh Circuit’s Hesitation
The Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he district court was rightly
skeptical about the utility of this plethora of [‘]factors.[’]” 228 And
although the court ultimately found that Hollins was not an employee
under the FLSA, the court declined to articulate a specific definitive
test to determine whether an individual is an employee or an unpaid
trainee. 229 The Seventh Circuit could not make “a one-size-fits-all
decision” about programs that include practical training or
internships. 230 Thus, the court explicitly stated that the decision in
Hollins should not be read to mean that all internships/trainings
involving practical skills are appropriate under the FLSA. 231 Rather,
evaluating such circumstances is on a case-by-case basis. 232
Thus, even after Hollins, the Seventh Circuit has not established a
clear-cut test to determine an employment relationship between unpaid
interns/trainees and employers. 233 Instead, the court has allowed
flexibility depending on the relationship at issue, leaving unpaid
interns and employers with many questions. 234

228

Hollins v. Regency Corp., 867 F.3d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 837.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
See Jeffrey W. Brecher, Hair Today, Gone Tomorrow: Seventh Circuit
Rejects Claims that Cosmetology Trainees Were Employees, LEXOLOGY, (Aug. 16,
2017).
234
Id.
229
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IV. THE UNPAID INTERNS’ EXPOSURE TO DANGER DUE TO LACK OF
TITLE VII PROTECTION
A. Brief Title VII Background
Usually, if an intern is found not to be an employee under the
FLSA, they also are not a qualified employee under Title VII. 235
Congress created Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for two
main purposes: (1) to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, which
has been fostered in the U.S for many years; and (2) to compensate the
victims of workplace discrimination. 236 With Title VII Congress
sought to create equal employment opportunities for individuals,
regardless of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin (“protected
categories”). 237 Title VII made it illegal for an employer to make
hiring, firing, compensation, or conditions of employment decisions
based on these protected categories. 238
In addition, Title VII is not limited to discrimination that leads to
tangible or economic impact. 239 The Supreme Court determined that
Title VII “strikes at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women . . . [including when they must] work in a discriminatorily
hostile or abusive environment.” 240 Thus, the Court extended Title VII
and made the creation and perpetuation of discrimination in a work
environment an actionable harm. 241 The Supreme Court intended to
decrease workplaces that are “so heavily polluted with discrimination
as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of
minority group workers.” 242 Thus, Title VII makes an employer
235

Hannah Nicholes, Making the Case for Interns: How the Federal Courts'
Refusal to Protect Interns Means the Failure of Title VII, 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS.
& INTELL. PROP. L. 81 (2014).
236
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S 405, 417 (1975).
237
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S 792, 800 (1973).
238
See id.
239
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S 775, 786 (1998).
240
Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 447 U.S 57, 64 (1986)).
241
See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2440 (2013).
242
Id.
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directly liable for an employee’s unlawful discriminatory harassment
and vicariously liable when the harasser is the victim’s supervisor. 243
Nevertheless, although Title VII is meant to protect employees
from work environments that are hostile or discriminatory, it leaves
unpaid interns without employment related federal protection. 244
Congress circularly defined “employee” under Title VII to mean, “an
individual employed by an employer.” 245 This is a similar definition
used to define “employee” under the FLSA. 246 Thus, if unpaid interns
are found not to be employees under the FLSA it is likely that the
courts will also find that students were not employees under Title
VII. 247 As a result, unpaid interns are not shielded by Title VII’s
protection of discrimination and hostile work environment based on
sex, race, color, national origin, and religion. 248 This lack of protection
has led to interns having to face challenges in the workplace, like
sexual harassment, without any way to seek legal relief, such as that
faced by the intern the case discussed below. 249
B. Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Wang v. Phoenix Satellite
Television US, Inc.
A lack of Title VII protection for interns was evident in the federal
New York case Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television, US, Inc. 250
Lihuan Wang was a broadcast journalism master’s degree student for
Syracuse University. 251 Wang obtained an unpaid internship at
243

See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 527,
529 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
244
See id.
245
42 U.S.C §2000e(f)(2012).
246
29 U.S.C § 203(g).
247
See Wang, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (using a similar test as FLSA cases to
determine if she was an employee).
248
See id.
249
See id.
250
See id.
251
Id.
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Phoenix Media Group, a Hong Kong-based media conglomerate that
produces television news geared towards Chinese-language
audiences. 252
During her internship, Wang began to receive unwanted sexual
attention from a supervisor, Mr. Zhengzhu Liu. 253 The attention
included making sexual comments, trying to forcefully kiss her, and
asking her to go to his hotel room. 254 Previous to this incident, Wang
and Liu talked about a permanent position and the company’s help to
obtain a work visa. 255 However, after the hotel incident, Liu told Wang
that the company would not be able to sponsor her. 256 Thus, Wang
sought protection under the New York States Human Rights Law 257
and the New York City Human Rights law 258 alleging that she was
unlawfully subjected to a hostile work environment due to Mr. Liu's
sexual advances. She further alleged that Phoenix discriminated
against her based-on gender because Mr. Liu linked future
employment opportunities based on her agreement to his sexual
demands and withdrew the opportunity once Wang rejected Mr. Liu’s
advancements. 259
Ultimately, the district court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed Wangs’ case, claiming that Wang was an
unpaid intern and not an employee under employment
discrimination statutes. 260 Thus, Wang was not entitled to

252

Id.
Id. at 530.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
N.Y. Exec. Law §290 (McKinney 2013).
258
N.Y Civ. Rights Law § 8-101 (2013).
259
See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 527,
529 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
260
Although Wang only sued under state law claims the district court
compared the language of Title VII to determine if an unpaid intern could be offered
protection under the statutes. See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976
F. Supp. 2d 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (the court concluded that Title VII did not
253
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protection under Title VII or any of New York’s employment
protecting statutes. 261
V. A UNIVERSAL CLEAR STANDARD
To create a more effective test and protection for interns, the
courts should narrow the number of tests they currently apply and
choose a single clear standard. 262 A clear standard would provide
employers a clear legal standard when creating their internship
program. Also, interns would know their rights and make decisions
with a better understanding of what is required of them and the
implications of being an intern. Thus, the courts should only look at
two factors: (1) are all the tasks assigned to the intern associated in
furtherance of their educational or career goals and is the intern aware
of how it will further their goals; and (2) does the intern replace any of
employer’s employees.
The first factor centers on whether the students are primarily
benefiting from the relationship. This requirement was clearly
established by Walling who stated that trainees were not employees
because trainees are working to serve their own interest. 263
Furthermore, while the courts look at the “totality of the
circumstances” to determine who benefits, the real focus should be on
protect interns and neither did New York’s equivalent statutes, leaving Wang
without a cause of action).
261
See Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 527,
532 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). However, Wang’s lack of employment protection did not
mean she did not have other causes of action. She was allowed to proceed with her
failure-to-hire claim. Kaitlyn E. Fallon, Changes in the legal landscape Regarding
Interns, VEDDER PRICE PC (June 10, 2015)
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4489b6f9-e46a-49db-bfdd791d8de1aff6 (last accessed Dec. 1, 2017). In addition, in response to Wang, New
York Mayor Bill de Blasio signed an amendment to the New York City Human
Rights Law on April 15, 2015, adding protections for both paid and unpaid interns.
Id.
262
This would likely require a Supreme Court decision or an enactment by
Congress.
263
See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947).
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whether the tasks the intern are doing give them the skills that would
make him successful in their future career. Thus, although in
Hollins, 264 the court interpreted the benefit analysis correctly it erred
in deciding that it should be a flexible approach. The court focused on
the development of the intern’s skills based on their career of
choice. 265 However, it did not look at if all the tasks were meant to
meet their educational and career goals or if the students were aware
what skills each task was helping them develop. If Hollins had been
labeled as a trainee, but only observed and took care of menial tasks,
like cleaning, it would have been reasonable to consider her an
employee because she would not have been practicing skills she
expected would make her successful cosmetologist. In addition, the
court’s emphasis in Hollins was on the fact that most of the student’s
time was spent providing services to clients and not conducting menial
tasks. 266 If cosmetology schools treated students as in the example I
referenced above, the students would not be providing any
cosmetology services thus weakening the court’s analysis that students
are trainees in cosmetology schools.
The second factor to consider is if the employer’s intention of
having an internship program is to displace the employers’ regular
full-time employees, whom they would be required by the FLSA to
provide greater benefits. Walling noted that trainees were not supposed
to “expedite the company business.” 267 This can be determined by
considering the amount of help, supervision, and internship that the
employer receives. Thus, the Seventh Circuit ruled incorrectly that the
students were not displacing employees. 268 In Hollins, the trainees
were doing what a licensed cosmetologist would do and where taking
away the business and employment from them. 269 The school should
have hired licensed cosmetologist and paired them with a trainee, a
264

See Hollins v. Regency Corp., 144 F.Supp.3d 990, 991 (N.D. IL 2015).
See id.
266
See id.
267
See Walling, 330 U.S. at 152.
268
See Hollins, 144 F.Supp.3d at 991.
269
See id.
265
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type of mentorship program. This would ensure the trainee was under
constant supervision and receiving feedback on their performance. In
addition, they would not have displaced employment opportunities
with Regency from licensed cosmetologist. Regency would not be
making money from the intern’s work. Rather, the money would come
from the licensed cosmetologist supervision and training.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, there has been a bubble of litigation dealing
with unpaid interns’ relationship with employers and the implications
of not being labeled as “employees.” These issues include wage and
hour, discrimination, and hostile work environments. Thus, courts
have had to juggle with different tests to determine what individuals
are employees and what individuals are unpaid interns. However, there
is not any universal test or clear guidance as to what employers should
do and what unpaid interns should expect. Legislators have started to
see these issues and have tried to address them. 270 Nevertheless, the
best solution would be a clear two-question universal test focused on
who primary benefits from the relationship. Therefore, when they ask:
“Mirror, mirror on the wall are they interns and not employees at all?”
The mirror can reflect clear guidance to the expectations of their
relationship. 271

270

Kaitlyn E. Fallon, Changes in the legal landscape Regarding Interns,
VEDDER PRICE PC (June 10, 2015) (New York signing a bill that protects interns
after the case Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television US, Inc.).
271
Note that the test would be evaluating an interns’ employment relationship
with the employer not evaluating the employers’ internship program as a whole.
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